Tortured Logic: Information and Brutality in Interrogations.
Pragmatic arguments for interrogational torture rest on the twin assumptions that torture generates reliable information and that torture can be controlled and limited. I assess the claims of torture proponents by providing the intuition behind a game theoretic model of interrogational torture. Tracing out the logic of different combinations of possible interrogators and detainee types results in eight outcomes that can be compared to three claims made by torture proponents: that information will be predictably reliable, that the frequency of torture will be minimized, including no torture of innocents, and that the severity of torture can likewise be limited and controlled. Of the eight outcomes generated by the model, only two result in full information, but an innocent is tortured in both and in one the detainee providing information is tortured after having no more information to give. Moreover, these outcomes are only possible for an extremely restricted and empirically unlikely combination of circumstances. With respect to torture frequency, detainees are tortured in seven of the eight outcomes, including innocent detainees. The incentives facing interrogators also compel them to ratchet up their brutality in an effort to compel information. The outcomes of a model of interrogational torture based on the proponent ideal violate the three conditions individually necessary to support that ideal: (1) information from torture is unpredictable and unreliable, with no information and false information far more likely than good information; (2) torture will be used more frequently-including against innocents-than control and limits permit; (3) torture will be more brutal than controls and limits allow. The only thing reliably effective about interrogational torture is its ability to generate slippery slopes of frequency and brutality, violating the basic premises of the pragmatic argument for interrogational torture.